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Percentage increments in global crop and livestock yields are slowing.
Percentage increments in global food demand may outstrip growth in food supply,
causing food prices to rise to year 2040.  Fortunately, the world seems headed for
zero population growth by year 2100 and developed nations face no great
economic, technological, or environmental hurdles in feeding themselves well.
Sub-Saharan Africa and selected other developing countries face severe food
security problems, however, but none severe enough to justify cutbacks in food
production to bring world population in line with global carrying capacity.  Food
security is within reach of any country willing to address its socioinstitutional
constraints and adopt the proven standard economic model.
The question posed by the symposium’s title “Is It Ethical to Increase World Food
Production?” is answered by a slight rephrasing of the title assigned to my presentation:  meeting
tomorrow’s global food needs is a moral imperative.  The title assigned me tips the hand of the
symposium planners:  they come from the moral imperative school of ethics.  They are in good
company.  Christians are bound by the biblical commands to “love thy neighbor” and “to be our
brothers’ keeper.”  Secular humanists also have little choice but to strive for global food security
defined as access by all people at all times to sufficient food for a productive and healthy life
(Tweeten 1997a, p. 226).
So much for the moral imperative school.  Many, if not virtually all, economists are of
the utilitarian ethical school.  I, personally, experience no conflict between the moral imperative
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school and the utilitarian schools of ethics.  The imperative to “love thy neighbor” is equivalent
to the utilitarian objective of promoting the public welfare.
Moral imperatives provide absolute moral guides that have difficulty addressing tradeoffs
in meeting food needs among people and over time.  The essence of utilitarian ethics embodied
in neo-classical economics from predictive (positive) and normative standpoints is to pursue an
activity if benefits exceed costs.  Thus, neo-classical economics offers a rich conceptual
framework  for measuring  how best to allocate resources over time and among people  (see Blue
and Tweeten for marginal utility of income).  Within that framework, this paper makes a case
that efforts to increase food production for a food secure world not only is morally justified, it
also is technically, environmentally, and economically feasible.  Increasing food output to meet
the needs of consumers today need not compromise future food security or the environment.
The paper briefly outlines the past and present global food security situation, then
projects future food supply and demand to measure the magnitude of challenge in meeting future
food needs.  Final sections address environmental and natural resource constraints.
Past and Present Food Security Situation
The world has made impressive progress indeed towards food security.  Numbers of
undernourished people in developing countries fell from 917 million in 1969–71 to 839 million
in 1990–92 and are projected to fall to 680 million in 2010 according to FAO estimates (Table
1).  The spectacular 207 million reduction in East and Southeast Asia more than offsets the 112
million addition to the number of undernourished people in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1969–
71 and 1990–92.3
Per capita dietary energy supply (DES), a useful indicator of food production per person,
increased 0.52 percent per year for the world and by even more (0.78 percent per year) in
developing countries between 1969–71 and 1990–92 (Table 2).  Progress is expected to slow—
FAO predicts DES will increase only 0.33 percent annually from 1990–92 to year 2010.
Table 1.  Actual and Projected Undernutrition in Developing Countries.
Actual Projected
Country 1969–71 1979–81 1990–92 2010
———————  million persons  ———————
(percent of region total)






















































Source:  FAO 1996a.
One region of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa, seems to be losing the capacity to feed
itself.  Food production per capita has been falling, and the number and incidence of food
insecure persons increased from 1979–81 to 1990–92.  Numbers are expected to grow at least to
year 2010.  The International Food Policy Research Institute (Rosegrant, et al., p. 15) projects4
that the region’s imports of all cereals will grow from 9.4 million metric tons (mmt) in 1990 to
26.1 mmt by 2020.  Paying for such imports will be a major challenge.
Table 2.  Average Per Capita Dietary Energy Supply.
Actual Projected
Classification 1969–71 1990–92 2010
————  calories (output)/day  ————
(annual % increase from previous period)












Source:  FAO 1996b, p. 2.
Global Food Supply and Demand to Year 2050
Some striking historic trends give clues to the future global food supply-demand balance.
Supply
The most profound historic pattern for the global food supply is the linear (straight line)
yield trend which holds for all major crop categories and is illustrated for cereals in Figure 1.
Worldwide yields of cereals, which provide over half of our calories and are the commodity of
choice for storage and transportation, increased on average by 30 pounds per acre from 1961 to
1996.  The percentage rate of trend increase fell from 3.2 percent in 1961 to half that rate in 1991
and continues to fall (Figure 1).  Yields of the other major crop categories—vegetables and
melons, pulses, roots and tubers, and oilseeds—also display linear trends.  Weighted percentage5
rates of increase in all crop yields to year 2050 assuming the 1961–96 linear trend continues are
shown in the top row of Table 3.
Rates of increase in livestock output per pound of feed are expected to continue to grow
less rapidly than crop yields.  Data are scarce on livestock yields, but the Office of Technology
Assessment projected that U.S. pounds of beef per pound of feed and pounds of pigmeat per
pound of feed would each increase only 0.2 percent per year from 1982 to year 2000, well below
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Metric tons per hectare




% change 3.20 2.42 1.95 1.63 1.51
Figure 1. World Cereal Yields, 1961 - 1996.6
In addition to crop and livestock yields, a third important element of food supply is area
in crops.  Global cropland area has increased just over 1 percent annually on average since 1961.
In the future, new cropland from drainage, clearing, irrigation, and other sources will be offset
markedly by cropland lost to forestation, grazing, desertification, salinization, waterlogging,
development, and other uses.  World cropland area is unlikely to expand significantly without
considerably higher farm commodity prices.  Additional land is available for cropping if needed,
but is of lower productivity and is subject to erosion or other environmental hazards.
Table 3.  World crop supply (yield) and demand (population and income per capita) trend
growth rates by selected years.
Projected




a 1.28 1.14 1.01 0.92 0.84 0.77
Demand
Population gain
  UN (medium) 1.44 1.24 1.08 0.88 0.65 0.48
Income effect gain
b 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.20
Total demand gain
UN pop. plus income 1.75 1.53 1.35 1.12 0.87 0.68
Excess demand
Demand less yield gain 0.47 0.39 0.34 0.20 0.03 -0.09
Price impact
Price flexibility (3.0) times excess demand 1.41 1.17 1.02 0.60 0.09 -0.27
aLinear yield trends weighted by calorie shares.
bSee Tweeten 1997b, Annex Table 1.7
Other potential sources of food supply gains such as irrigation and ocean fishing have
been falling off in recent years but offer promise for the future with proper incentives and
management.  Africa could significantly expand irrigation, and temperate zones such as the U.S.
cornbelt could receive supplemental irrigation if crop prices provide incentives.
Because of difficulty in expanding crop area, aggregate food supply trend in Table 3 is
represented by aggregate crop yield trend.  Assuming that livestock yields increase at the same
rate as crop yields and that cropland area remains constant, global farm output (which increased
over 3 percent annually in the 1960s) will increase at an annual trend rate of only 1.3 percent in
year 2000 and 0.8 percent by year 2050.
Food Demand
If world population would continue to grow at the 2 percent annual rate of 1970 or the 1.5
percent rate of 1996, the future portents of declining percentage gains in food production per acre
would be sobering indeed.  But we are in the midst of a remarkable turnaround (inflection point)
in global population growth.  For centuries, population has been increasing exponentially—at an
increasing rate—as predicted by Thomas Malthus exactly two centuries ago.  But demographers
predict population will increase at a decreasing rate to reach zero population growth (ZPG) by
year 2130 or earlier.
The best available estimates of ZPG population and year of arrival are shown in Table 4.
Two especially credible estimates are from the reputable International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) projecting 10.5 billion people and the United Nations (UN) medium
estimate projecting 10.3 billion people at ZPG.  Adding to population growth the expected food
demand growth of about 0.3 percent per capita annually due to income, overall demand for food
is expected to grow by 144 to 147 percent by ZPG (Table 4).8













IIASA (Lutz et al.) 10.5 2084 144
UN (medium) 10.3 2094 147
World Bank (Bos et al.) 11.3 2128 201
Source:  see Tweeten, 1997b.
a1995 world population 5.6 billion; 1999 world population 6.0 billion.
bWhen data from the source were incomplete, the ZPG population and year were projected using
a quadratic equation fitted to available data.
cAssumes per capita demand grows 0.3 percent/year from income.
The above projected requirement for food supply to increase about 2.5 times from the
1995 level to meet demand at ZPG could be less based on alternative demographic projections.
Steven Mosher, president of the Population Research Institute, projects global ZPG to arrive at 7
billion people by year 2030; David Seckler of the International Irrigation Management Institute
and Michael Rock of Winrock International project ZPG at 8 billion by year 2040; and Dennis
Avery of the Hudson Institute projects ZPG at 9 billion or less by year 2040.  If these projections
are realized, food demand growth will be less than shown in Table 3 and real farm prices likely
will continue to fall. While the assumptions underlying estimates of Avery, Mosher, Seckler, and
Rock are not explicit, their projections may inadequately account for population momentum from
the large numbers of women in developing countries who will be in child-bearing ages to year
2030.  Of course, population projections by agencies and individuals undergo frequent revisions.
Supply-Demand Balance
The global food supply-demand balance is projected to year 2050 in Table 3.  Demand
growth is the medium United Nation’s projection.  Trend supply growth as measured by linear9
crop yield projections is expected to fall short of demand growth by 0.5 percent in year 2000 and
by 0.03 percent in year 2040, after which supply growth is expected to exceed demand growth.
Real prices for farm food ingredients could increase 1.4 percent per year in 2000, falling
to 0.09 percent per year by 2040.  This trend contrasts sharply with the 0.6 percent annual
average decline in real farm prices from 1910-14 to 1996.
The conclusion is that, even allowing for error, world food supply-demand balance is
likely to be tighter over the next 3-4 decades than in recent decades.  Affluence coupled with the
“noise” of weather shocks from year to year will mask real food price gains in industrial
countries.  Americans, for example, spend about 2 percent of their incomes on farm food
ingredients. Hence, even a doubling (absurd) of farm level food prices would reduce their real
income only 2 percent.  That is equal to normal economic growth of just a single year.  Thus,
affluent societies will hardly notice tighter food supplies except for occasional food price spikes.
Farmers and low income consumers at home and abroad are likely to notice the change,
however.  Because farmland earnings are a residual, real farm prices rising 1 percent per year on
average would raise real land earnings and prices in excess of 1 percent per year.  The major
problem will be for consumers of Africa and other low income countries who will have difficulty
competing with more wealthy regions for food.
Policies to Provide Food Security
The foregoing analysis indicates that the world can continue to feed itself without
significant food price increases and without heroic measures to reduce population growth.
However, family planning information to allow parents to have no more children than they want10
coupled with a serious commitment of nations to raise productivity of agriculture will be central
to food security.
Key constraints that could thwart meeting future food needs are:
1. Environmental degradation, including natural resource depletion.
2. Lack of agricultural productivity growth.
3. Socioinstututional failure.
Space limitations preclude in-depth treatment of each of these issues, but some observations are
offered below.
Environmental Degradation and Natural Resource Depletion
So-called Kuznets Curves trace the relationship between economic progress and
environmental degradation.  A common pattern is for economic development first to degrade the
environment.  At later stages of growth, many environmental problems are addressed and
diminished (World Resources Institute, Chs. 6–12).  Compared to the 1950s, in the United States
water erosion of soil has fallen by half, the quality of river and lake water has improved, city air
is cleaner, wildlife has become more abundant, and food has become safer from chemicals and
pathogens (see Tweeten and Amponsah).  Groundwater contamination by agricultural chemicals
is manageable, solid waste disposal is tractable, forest area is increasing, and (except for
immigration) the nation is headed for zero population growth.
Globally, perhaps the major concern is depletion of fossil fuel, phosphate, and water
supplies.  Biotechnology and other emerging technology will continue to expand output available
from farm production inputs, but some analysts contend that petroleum could become very
scarce in 60 years and coal in 200 years (see Tweeten and Amponsah).  Economic petroleum
reserves may be gone before the world reaches ZPG, but coal, shale, tar sands, wind, sun, and11
nuclear sources offer energy adequate for hundreds of years.  Even if an affluent world runs short
of energy, it will take care of its most basic need—food.  Greenhouse gases continue to build in
the atmosphere, but evidence of global warming remains weak.  Global warming, even if it
occurs, does not seem to threaten global food and timber supplies although it would cause major
disruptions in food supply among regions (Schimmelpfenning, pp. 28–31).
Perhaps the major concern is phosphate, a basic building block of nature with no
substitutes, but known reserves are adequate for about 250 years (Tweeten and Amponsah).
More reserves may be found, supplies recycled, and scientific solutions found to stretch available
supplies.
Limited water supplies will especially constrain development in North Africa, the Middle
East, and India.  Science will be challenged to use biotechnology and other means to raise
agricultural output by year 2100 more than as much as improved seeds and breeds, synthetic
fertilizers, irrigation, and pesticides improved agriculture in the past 10,000 years of its
existence.
Investment in Productivity Growth
On average from 1982 to 1992 the U.S. annually lost 377,400 cropland acres or 0.08
percent of all its cropland area to urban development (see Tweeten forthcoming) and another
0.05 percent of cropland productivity to soil erosion (see Crosson).  During the same period,
aggregate output of crops and livestock per unit of all production inputs increased 2 percent
annually (Ahearn et al., p. 5).  Hence, each year of productivity gains from science and
technology offset 20 years of productivity loss to urbanization and erosion.  Such productivity
gains are within reach of developing countries that follow proper policies.12
As noted in Table 2, all regions of the world show major progress in raising food output
per capita and reducing population growth except Sub-Saharan Africa.  Africa invests only 0.5
percent of its agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) in agricultural research in contrast to the
U.S. which invests over 3 percent and many other industrial nations which spend over 2 percent
of agricultural GDP on agricultural research and extension.  Clearly, Africa invests too little to
be food secure.
Ability to expand cropland has enabled Africa to expand food production despite slow
yield gains.  It is notable that Africa’s falling per capita food production is not the result of
production gains lagging behind other regions (Mitchell et al., pp. 50, 169), but rather its little
progress in movement through the demographic transition to lower birth rates.  Food insecure
countries, being poor, face a challenge bidding against industrialized countries for food.  Of
course, developing countries that are net exporters of food will gain from higher food prices.  But
many export coffee, cocoa, and tea—items which may not share in general food price gains.
Socioinstitutional Constraints
A key to a better environment, ZPG, and food security is economic progress.  The food
security dilemma is that economic growth bringing these major benefits also generates more
greenhouses gases and depletes natural resources.  The difficulty is exacerbated as growth
accelerates in China, India, and other developing countries with large populations.  All nations
can be prosperous together, and the market will set prices to constrain use of scarce resources
such as fossil fuels and encourage use of service activities favored by people to raise quality of
life.  Taxes or other means must be used to internalize external costs of pollution, however, to
avoid the “tragedy” of common property such as air.13
Affluence has moved nations through the demographic transition to the enviable current
outlook for zero population growth.  To achieve food security, developing countries have no
alternative but to follow sound economic policies to promote affluence leading to ZPG and
financing agricultural research, infrastructure, and environmental programs.
I (Tweeten 1997a, pp. 251, 252) have advanced a food security synthesis to discipline
thinking.  The synthesis is that
• Food insecurity is caused mainly by poverty.
• The cure for poverty is broad-based, sustainable economic development which
will directly or indirectly (through transfers) raise buying power of people.
“Broad-based” refers to development that reaches women, minorities, rural
people, and indeed the broad spectrum of population through human resource
investments and access to opportunity.
• Economic development is attainable by any country willing to follow the
standard model that relies mainly on markets but with a supportive government
policies providing public goods and correcting externalities (Tweeten 1997a, pp.
232–243).  I describe the standard model in detail elsewhere, but note here that
the choice of the market over central planning is no longer ideological.  The
choice is empirical as evidenced by the economic and food security success of
South Korea over North Korea, of Hong Kong and Taiwan over China, and of
Chile over Cuba.
• Countries do not follow the standard model partly out of ignorance, but mostly
due to political failure.  Ending even the worst policies produces losers who stop
reform if they are in positions of authority.14
• Political failure traces to institutional failure such as lack of a representative
government.  Failure to protect property rights or granting monopoly power to a
privileged few also retards progress.
• Institutional failure traces to cultural factors such as tolerance of corruption and
despotic rule.  Another problem is tribalism that leads to nepotism, factionalism,
and violence.
Socioinstitutional change, the key to ending food insecurity, will not occur unless the
people want it.  Several food insecure countries in Africa give increasing evidence that they want
to change.  The United States and other developed countries can encourage and facilitate that
change by opening markets to trade and by sharing knowledge to bring food security, but
outsiders cannot force the change.
Conclusions
Global food output can meet the needs of people for the foreseeable future.  The only
moral justification for halting food expansion today would be to avoid starving people of future
generations.  This paper provides evidence that we do not face that moral dilemma, and our best
efforts can go into better meeting food needs of all today and tomorrow.
The trend towards zero population growth is a recent but seminal happening with
felicitous portents for sustainable global food security.  This analysis indicates that maintaining
the historic (linear) increase in food supply of the past four decades for another food decades will
see us through a tight supply-demand balance to ZPG after which the going may get easier.
Food security seems attainable with current or only slightly higher real farm prices.  Several
analysts project even better news for consumers—falling real food prices (Mitchell and Ingco for15
World Bank; Rosegrant et al. for International Food Policy Research Institute).  Mitchell et al.
indicate from their simulations that the world could feed twice today’s population in 20 years.
Yeh et al. showed in the 1970s that if pressed the U.S. alone could physically provide enough
calories to feed the world.  Such an outcome is only an academic exercise—such drastic
measures are neither necessary nor desirable from an economic standpoint.
Some deep ecologists contend the world cannot sustain even today’s population.
Estimates of global sustainable carrying capacity range widely.  In fact, carrying capacity
depends on technology, diet, and a host of other factors.  If the food supply-demand balance
tightens, food prices will rise to encourage more technological innovation, cultivation of more
acres, investment in irrigation, a shift from costly meats to more grains and tubers, and a host of
other adjustments ensuring an adequate diet.
Shifting from consumption of meat to cereals and other crops would alone feed
millions of additional population with no harmful environmental consequences.  This is not a call
for people to be vegetarians—such drastic action is unnecessary.  If it becomes necessary, the
market will adjust by lifting meat prices to encourage substitution of crop-based foods for
livestock-based foods.
In conclusion, the outlook for technology, the environment, and natural resources
promises  potential global food security for generations.  Despite adequacy of resources to
provide food security for all, many people will continue to be food insecure.  The root causes lie
in institutions and attitudes.  Nations must follow sound economic policies, relying heavily on
markets but with the government doing a few things well.  They must continue to invest in
improved technologies to raise food production efficiency and protect the environment.16
Several countries, many in Sub-Saharan Africa, will not follow proper economic policies
to escape abject general poverty and food insecurity.  Tribal and other conflicts will exacerbate
the situation.  Thus, the failure to be food secure traces to man, not nature.  The moral imperative
is not to constrain food production; on the contrary, the moral imperative is to address the core
socioinstitutional problems such as ignorance, indifference, corruption, tribalism, despotism,
family disintegration, and socialist policies that are the root cause of food insecurity.
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